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ABSTRACT This paper revaluates key moments in the court politics of Alexander the 
Great’s reign through the introduction of philia-networks governed by gift-exchange as 
a template for explaining the relationships between key participants. This approach 
makes it clear that Alexander initially held a passive role in the political life of his own 
court and was dependant on others for his succession. These dynamics shifted in the 
opening years of the Asian expedition as Alexander sought to break these philia-
networks, building his own and surrounding his person with philoi of his own choosing. 
 
 




To be a ruler in the ancient world was to be involved in a never-ending game of political 
chicanery with the elite. The Argead family of Macedonia, although the ruling house 
from at least the turn of the sixth into the fifth century, were no exception, and neither 
was the household’s most famous name: Alexander III the Great.1 Alexander, when his 
father, Philip II, died in 336 was by no means assured of succession to the Macedonian 
kingship. That Alexander did succeed was due to his support from prominent men –
especially Antipater and Parmenio– who controlled vast networks of philoi. The 
recognition of the role played by prominent political factions in Alexander’s court is 
itself nothing new and most recently Waldemar Heckel has argued for the existence of 
political factions centred on both Antipater and Parmenio at Alexander’s court2. 
Furthermore, Heckel’s presentation of the struggles between the two groups and the 
king has been echoed by Strootman, who in his study of Hellenistic courts ties the 
culture back to the example of the later Argeads.3 Nonetheless, neither of these two 
 
* This paper has had a very long gestation, with the central thesis originally the product of an 
undergraduate paper written in 2016. My thanks go to Lynette Mitchell, the convenor of that excellent 
module, not only for starting me on this journey but for her endless encouragement in many endeavours 
since.  
1 There has been some debate about the exact origins of the Argead household, for which Herodotus 
(8.137-8) and Thucydides (2.99.2) in rare alignment are the cause. See: MARI 2015, 81; contra 
HAMMOND 1972, 430-40, who also discusses the roots of the Argeads and Temenids.  
2 HECKEL 2003, divides the power at Alexander’s court into Antipatrid, Parmenion-Attalus and 
Alexander factions, although HECKEL (202-3) underplays the power of Parmenio’s philoi. 







lines of argument can fully explain the deadly struggles that occurred between 
Alexander’s accession and the death of Parmenio in 330. It is the aim of this paper to 
provide a new explanation to these struggles through the introduction of philia-
networks as a template for understanding what have been termed as political factions 
by others.  
This paper will proceed firstly by outlining that the Greek conception of philia in a 
political context, most persuasively defined by Aristotle, can be applied to the court of 
Alexander. Indeed, philia was a core precept of elite Macedonian political life. After 
establishing this, it will be shown how a new, philia-network approach to the “factional 
politics” of Alexander’s court allows a more nuanced understanding of the political 
position of the king when he began his conquest of the Achaemenid Empire in 334, and 
how this position evolved as power dynamics shifted until a new phase of philia-
networking began in 229, when Alexander’s own philoi sought to build their own 
networks. It shall be argued that at the outset of his rule Alexander was beholden to the 
power-dynamics which had secured the throne for him and that, demonstrating a great 
deal of political acumen, Alexander redressed this power balance in order to stem the 
influence of philia-networks. This was done, largely, by utilising the notion of gift-
exchange in both material (land) and immaterial (status, favours) means to create new 
bonds within the political elite that favoured the king. Naturally, this last element also 
included promoting and expanding his own network of philoi. 
 
 
PHILIA IN MACEDONIAN COURT CULTURE 
 
It is no great leap to state that the majority of Greek political life was conducted by the 
elite. Nonetheless, even within this narrow group no elite family could seek to gain 
political power without the co-option or coercion of fellow elites in order to build a 
broader base for their dominance4. Both the extent and duration of the factional politics 
which often resulted from tensions between elite families are demonstrated well by a 
cursory glance at the tensions between the ousters of the Peisistratids: Isagoras and 
Cleisthenes. Herodotus (5.66) informs us that there was a power struggle between the 
two men in the vacuum created after the ousting of the Peisistratids tyranny, a power 
struggle in which Isagoras initially won the upper hand.5 However, Isagoras did not 
hold the archonship at this time having already done so in 525/4, therefore, and as Greg 
Anderson has noted, the primacy of Isagoras was not from electoral outcomes but from 
his wider political support6. It is this type of factional support, a loose and fluid 
congregation of men associated with Isagoras, which also prevailed elsewhere, and 
which can be termed a philia-network. 
The relationship through which factions such as those who supported Isagoras and 
Cleisthenes were united was a bond of philia. Aristotle gives an insight, albeit from a 
philosophical standpoint, on the role philia played in civic life which demonstrates 
contemporary awareness the role philia played in politics. Aristotle (Pol. 1280b38-9) 
 
4 The relationship between rulers and elites in the Macedonian context has been examined in some detail 
by CARNEY 2015; KING 2010 and WEBER 2009. For elite-ruler relations more generally see MITCHELL 
2013, who notes similarities between Macedonian kingship and others.  
5 Although Isagoras initially won supremacy over Athens, his period of prominence was short lived. 
Herodotus (5.69-73.1) goes on to demonstrate how Cleisthenes drove Isagoras’ faction out of Athens and 
into the hands of Cleomenes I of Sparta. cf. AP 20.1-4.  
6 ANDERSON 2005, 181-2 argues that holding the Archonship was not a way of gaining power but a 
reflection of who already held power in Athens at that time.  






states that philia is an essential feature of the polis and forms the bedrock on which 
civic institutions are built. Of course, not all philiai were the same and Aristotle 
categorised philoi into three groups: kin, comrades and xenoi7. Additionally, philia 
itself could be subdivided into deep-rooted bonds of virtue, bonds of pleasure and, most 
relevant for this study, bonds of utility8. Aristotle (Nic Eth. 1156a24-26) states that 
bonds of utility are most evident in political life and uses the example of sailors who 
needed to rely on each other to reach their destination safely, but whose bond is then 
broken upon their return home to emphasise the expedient nature of this kind of 
relationship. It is likely that the supporters of Isagoras and Cleisthenes would have 
primarily bound by this utilitarian conception of philia, with the supporters of either 
man to numerous in number to have all been linked by bonds of kinship. 
Why the supporters of men such as Isagoras or Cleisthenes should have been philoi 
in the first place is itself a question which must be answered. It is once again Aristotle 
(Nic. Eth. 1158b1-5) who illuminates us when he introduces the notion of reciprocal 
exchange as the core mechanism which governed these philia-networks and allowed 
them to propagate and be retained for the future. Lynette Mitchell has examined the use 
of gift-giving and exchange in a political context and has argued that there existed two 
categories of reciprocal relationship.9 The first, termed the vertical axis of exchange, 
accounts for the flow of goods and services along the social ladder between philoi of 
unequal social standing. The second, naturally termed the horizontal axis of exchange, 
is the provision of goods and services by men of roughly equal social rank. The 
importance of both of these levels of exchange, and the tensions between them, is well 
elaborated by Xenophon’s (Mem 2.3.11-14) tale of a debate between Socrates and 
Chaerecrates, his brother. Socrates berates his brother for his conduct and points out 
that the most importance element of philia is its reciprocal nature. Even more 
importantly, it is essential that the man who wishes to make the acquaintance offer his 
services first; such an action creates a debt which must be repaid10. 
Of course, both Aristotle and Xenophon were presenting ideal types in their analysis 
of the role philia played in relationships, be they political or social. Nonetheless, the 
issues at stake in both of their conceptions can be witnessed in the archonship election 
of 508/7, when Cleisthenes kinsman Alcmeon was appointed, and the events which 
followed11. Herodotus (5.69) is certainly in no doubt as to the supremacy of Cleisthenes 
at this time despite the fact he was not in office. Cleisthenes influence was a product of 
his philia-network and Alcmeon’s election can be viewed on both horizontal and 
vertical axes of exchange. The horizontal was naturally Cleisthenes support for 
Alcmeon, although as a superior partner, with Cleisthenes presumably gaining access 
to the power that the archonship had to offer through his kin as his end of the bargain. 
Their kinship should not obscure from the fact that in the political arena they still 
required a degree of utilitarian benefits from one another, it is merely that as kin we 
should be less surprised of their alliance. The vertical axis of exchange comes into play 
when it is considered that we are discussing an election. In exchange for support, 
Cleisthenes could offer his politically lesser philoi some sort of seat at the table of 
 
7 Kin: Nic Eth. 8,1157b 1-5. Comrades: Nic Eth 8,1161a25-7, 1161b33a1. Xenoi: Nic Eth. 1161b15-20. 
8 This distinction is repeated several times but is most notable at Aristot. Nic Eth. 8, 1156a6-10 
9 The horizontal axis of exchange is described in MITCHELL 1997, 42-6. For the vertical axis see: 46-51.  
10 There are numerous other examples of this sort of reciprocal relationship in practice, Homer (Il. 6.120-
232) provides perhaps the earliest example.  








power –in Cleisthenes case this was through a series of reforms to the Athenian tribal 
structure12.  
The utilisation of philia-networks witnessed in late sixth-century Athens can be 
translated into the distinct context of the Macedonian court, albeit complicated by the 
presence of the king at the centre of all political activity13. The complication implicit in 
monarchy comes from the unequal status between the monarch and his (or occasionally 
her) philos which sits in direct contrast to equality, which was the concept at the very 
centre of Aristotelian philia14. Nonetheless the problem of inequality between philoi is 
dealt with by Aristotle himself, who was aware that not all relationships could be equal 
in practice. Furthermore, Aristotle explicitly cites the relationship between the ruler and 
the ruled in his discussion of how unequal relationships worked (Nic. Eth. 1158b7-
1159b25). Aristotle (Nic. Eth. 1161a10-22) later takes this point further, likening the 
relationship between a ruler and those he rules to that between a shepherd and his flock 
and a father and his children. In both cases, Aristotle is keen to point out that the benefits 
for the ruled outweigh the benefits for the ruler, who is honoured and held in esteem in 
exchange for offering the benefits of his philia.  
Aristotle’s view of unequal relationships is to a degree typical of the view of the 
ruler put forward by Xenophon, who in his Hiero (most explicitly: 11.14-15) stresses 
that a good ruler should aim to be loved by his people for his generosity. Aristotle’s 
view, however, is more practically applicable than this. Aristotle notes (Nic. Eth. 
1161a33-34) that if the inferior philos has nothing to offer, no philia can hope to exist 
between them. This statement is an acknowledgement of the practicalities of ruling and 
demonstrates that philia has a place in the court politics of a king in the fifth and early 
fourth centuries. Indeed, the practical nature of philiai between rulers and their philoi 
can be seen in the tempestuous rivalry for the ear of Xerxes between Artabanus, his 
uncle, and Mardonius, son of Gobyras, a leading proponent of the invasion of Greece15. 
Xerxes relationship with his uncle is continually challenged due to the failure of 
Artabanus to provide a useful service to him –although, Herodotus is being ironic here 
and much of Artabanus’ advice is sound and therefore mistakenly ignored by a bad king 
Xerxes– and, therefore, Artabanus’ philia with Xerxes inevitably breaks down.  
Precisely the role philia networks played in the unique Macedonian context can only 
be guessed at prior to the death of Philip II, due to the dearth of evidence16. However, 
an analysis of the movements of various individuals in the wake of Philip’s murder 
reveals clear patterns that demonstrate philia networks did indeed have a major role in 
the Macedonian court17. This is not the place at attempt a fresh answer to the question 
 
12 On the reforms of Cleisthenes see DE STE. CROIX 2004a; 2004b.  
13 The nature of the Macedonian monarchy continues to be the subject of a debate between the followers 
of either DE FRANCISCI 1948, who believed the Argeads to be highly autocratic, versus the followers of 
GRANIER 1931, who invented the constitutionalist stance. More recently, HATZOPOULOS 1996 has 
provided a compelling version of Macedonian monarchy as a national monarchy. See also: MITCHELL 
2013. 
14 Aristotle (1157b35) makes the importance of equality in reciprocal exchange clear: “λέγεται γάρ 
φιλότηϛ ἰσότηϛ,” cf. MITCHELL 1997, 8-9. 
15 The pro-war and anti-war factions which these two men represent in Herodotus seems entirely 
legitimate, even if the speeches and the intense nature of the rivalry between them has the potential to be 
exaggerated. Their quarrel begins immediately upon Xerxes accession at 7.5 and continues through to 
7.53 when Artabanus is sent back to Susa.  
16 RHODES 2010 provides a good summary of the problems relating to the evidence of the period. Cf. 
MARI 2011. 
17 STROOTMAN 2014 has argued that gift-exchange prevailed as the primary currency between the king 
and his philoi in the context of Hellenistic royal courts. This can certainly be projected back.  






of who killed Philip II, however, it is Philip’s murder which illuminates two important 
roles that these philia networks held18. Firstly, the immediate aftermath of Philip’s 
murder demonstrates that the primary aim of philia networks amongst the Macedonian 
elite was to gain access to the person of the king and in doing so to exert influence over 
the core decision making centre of the Macedonian political system19. The second, more 
specific to Alexander III, is that Alexander does not appear to have controlled, but was 
controlled by, these powerful political forces in the earliest phase of his reign. 
Additionally, both patterns remained prevalent throughout Alexander’s later rule as 
new groups of philoi emerged to compete for the king’s ear (dealt with in the second 
half of this paper). 
The first of these two points, the desire to be at the heart of the decision-making 
process, is evidenced in the movements and the formations of the philia-networks 
existing in 336. In the year prior to his murder Philip II had made a conscious decision 
to publicly expand his network of philoi through marriage to Cleopatra, daughter of 
Attalus20. As Carney has correctly noted, whilst this decision would have caused natural 
angst amongst Alexander’s supporters, it was nothing out of the ordinary in a 
polygamous ruling family such as the Argeads21. However, this is not the entire story. 
Curtius (6.19.6) informs us that Attalus had married the daughter of Parmenio, a 
wedding which must pre-date Philip’s death only on account of Attalus’ position as one 
of the two commanders (the other Parmenio himself) leading the advanced guard in 
Asia Minor at the time Philip was murdered22. The unification of these two families 
through a formal bond of marriage, making them kin, transformed two already powerful 
individuals with their own philia-networks into an extremely potent bloc within 
Macedonian elite society (see Figure 1 and Appendix A). Furthermore, this horizontal 
exchange had a lot to offer each of its participants in the long term and, therefore, must 
have appeared particularly potent with the potential for the philia to extend for a lengthy 
duration23. 
 
18 The majority of the events discussed here occurred after Philip was murdered. Whoever killed Philip 
II either kept their role in the murder private, aside from the assailant Pausanias himself, or as BOSWORTH 
1971, 102 has suggested, Alexander suppressed the identity of the killer for political purposes. Of course, 
the murderer(s) had the advantage of knowing Philip’s death was imminent and, therefore, had an 
advantage in the factional infighting that followed. Nonetheless, the murderer(s) had no guarantee that 
their plot would succeed and, if their role(s) was indeed kept private then, they could not openly benefit 
from them. Excellent discussions of Philip’s death include BADIAN 1963 [2012]; 2000 [2012], who views 
Alexander III as the likely culprit. CARNEY 2015, who discredits the notion of Olympias’ involvement 
in detail. Additionally, CARNEY 2015 has discussed the possible role of the Lyncestian Alexander, who 
she states must have played a more dominant role than is often assumed. This view can be seen in tandem 
with BOSWORTH 1971, who places tensions between Upper and Lower Macedonians at the root of the 
matter. ANTELA-BERNARDEZ 2012 has made note of Attalus’ involvement. All arguments have merits.  
19 HECKEL 2003, 206-7 in particular, notes the importance of proximity to the king. For this reason, 
Heckel places the somatophylakes as the position of highest status in the court. Additionally, see 
SPAWFORTH 2007, 87-8 who highlights the importance of proximity to the king for influence and BRIANT 
1996, 200-4, who notes how the nature of Alexander’s mobile court system effected such matters. 
20 D.S. 17.2.3; Ath 13.560c. CARNEY 2015, 170 has noted that Philip probably wished to take Alexander 
and Amyntas to Asia and it was therefore expedient to re-marry prior to departure. However, Philip could 
well have produced a successor with one of his pre-existing wives instead and therefore the marriage 
must have been political.  
21 CARNEY 2015, 167. Cf. LANE FOX 2011, 386 who believes Just. 9.7.3 and 11.2.3 can be used to provide 
evidence that Cleopatra did indeed have a son named Caranos. OGDEN 1999 discussed the implications 
of polygamy in more general terms.    
22 D.S 16.93.8-9 and Justin 9.5.8-9 inform us of Attalus’ role in the campaign. 
23 If claims that Attalus wished to rule as regent are to have any substance to them, then Attalus surely 







Much like his long-time acquaintance Parmenio, Antipater, son of Iolus, was equally 
involved in the internecine struggles of the Macedonian elite to secure their preferred 
candidate on the throne after Philip’s death24. The ‘Antipatrid-Antigonid Group’, as it 
has been coined by Waldemar Heckel, appears to have played an equally significant 
role in the politics of Alexander’s succession (See Appendix B)25. In this case, the links 
between the group appear more difficult to draw out due to the deaths of many potential 
protagonists. Nonetheless, it can be said with relative certainty that Antipater’s philoi 
included amongst their number: the Lyncestian Alexander, who was related through 
marriage his to Antipater’s daughter and whose role shall be elaborated further below; 
Alexander of Lyncestis’ brothers; Balagros, one of Philip’s somatophylakes and 
Antigonus, who was much closer in age to Antipater than Alexander26.  
In the middle of this political web was Alexander, who appears to have been at the 
mercy of those greater forces around him. Even though Alexander’s previous actions 
at Chaeronea (Plu. Alex 9.2-3) had proven his right to rule by din of his charisma, 
certainly vis-à-vis the other candidates, and despite Alexander being surrounded by his 
own web of philoi, his position was precarious. Olympias, being brother to Alexander 
of Molossia and having been involved in the politics of Philip’s court for considerable 
time, was probably the best placed of Alexander’s allies to press his claim27. 
 
 
Fig. 1: The philiai of Parmenio and Attalus. 
 
The accession of Alexander as king of Macedonia was a result of the power struggle 
between the Antipater and Parmenio philia-networks, and brings discussion to point 
two: Alexander was controlled by these networks in the earliest parts of his reign. When 
Philip was murdered, whoever murdered him, there was an immediate scramble 
 
amongst the Upper Macedonians, appearing to have links with the sons of Andromenes, eg. Arr. An. 
3.27.1. 
24 HECKEL 2003, 200 has gone further and stated that Antipater’s political involvement at this time was 
in reaction to the Parmenio-Attalus faction. However, the swiftness of political action after Philip’s death 
and the large scale of these philia networks must have required some bonds to already have been in place. 
Antipater was to important to have been politically unaligned. CARNEY 2015, 127-140 has argued that 
Antipater was but one player in a wider group led instead by the Lyncestian sons of Aëropus. There was 
clearly a bond between these men, yet, to say which was the more important prior to Alexander’s 
accession is difficult. What can be said is that Antipater emerged as the dominant force.  
25 HECKEL 2003, 196. 
26 On the relationship between Antigonus and Antipater see HECKEL 2006, 32-33. Much of the evidence 
for their philia post-dates Alexander, nonetheless, the treatment of Antigonus by Alexander is suggestive 
of a philia existing between the two at this time –see below.  
27 Little can be said of Alexander’s hetairoi at this time.  






amongst the elite to ensure that their preferred candidate ended up on the throne28. 
Clearly, the Parmenio-Attalus philia network would have supported the claims of any 
child born to Cleopatra. Even if the child were a girl, a suitable match could have been 
found or Cleopatra remarried to a suitable candidate29. Furthermore, and as argued by 
Bosworth, the comments placed into the mouth of Alexander by Curtius (6.8.16) that 
Philotas had supported the claims of Amyntas cannot be ruled out entirely. It is possible 
that after the murder of Cleopatra Parmenio switched his support to Amyntas before 
ultimately falling on the side of Alexander. The ambitions of the Parmenio-Attalus 
philia had ramifications also for those on the other side. For someone like Antipater, 
whose status surely demanded a seat at the highest table, allowing Parmenio and Attalus 
such influence could only come at his own expense. In this situation Antipater’s options 
were limited; Alexander, eldest son and certainly the only candidate to have 
conclusively proven his aretē on the field of battle or Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III, 
who appears to have either siezed the opportunity or, as is suggested by Plutarch (Mor. 
327c), to have been nominated as a figurehead by others with ambition30. That Antipater 
chose the former over the latter may have come down to a combination of Antipater’s 
personal experiences with Alexander and Alexander’s relative youth vis-à-vis the other 
candidates31. Alongside this, Alexander may have had the benefit of being the only 
candidate present (excluding Philip Arrhidaeus). It is far from a leap to assume that 
Antipater would prefer a king he could influence over one he could not, that was, after 
all, the point of all infighting amongst the elites after Philip’s death.  
Alexander’s greatest debt to Antipater was not merely Antipater’s support for his 
claim, but Antipater’s ability persuade the Lyncestian Alexander to join his cause at the 
detriment of his brothers. Carney has made note of the power that the Lyncestian sons 
of Aëropus may have held at court and has speculated that it was the sons of Aëropus 
who had pushed the claim of Amyntas as a rival to the throne32. The case for Lyncestian 
involvement is compelling and if the sons of Aëropus did indeed back Amyntas over 
Alexander it would have created a formidable power-bloc comprising of Amyntas 
himself, the three Lyncestian brothers and their adherents in Upper Macedonia (from 
which many military units came) and any of Amyntas’ own philoi33. Nonetheless, the 
decision of Lyncestian Alexander to publicly declare for Alexander III still warrants 
 
28 The death of Philip II and its aftermath has been the subject of numerous debates, see: BADIAN 1963 
[2012]; 2007 [2012], who has placed Alexander III as the chief culprit; BOSWORTH 1971, has highlighted 
the role of the Lyncestian faction; CARNEY 2015, 167-178 examines the death of Philip from a 
polygamous perspective and points out the difficulties with providing a credible reason for any to commit 
the murder –all had motive but all had much to lose. In addition: LANE FOX 1973, 17-25 and 503-505 
who builds on Diodorus; contra HATZOPOULOS 2005, 43-65 who doubts Diodorus as a source. 
29 D.S. 17.2.3 explicitly refers to Attalus as a rival for the throne. HECKEL 1991, 5 rightly notes that he 
had no obvious legal claim to be king and it seems likely that Diodorus’ meaning here is his implied rule 
through his niece. The remarriage of Cleopatra would have been perfectly acceptable, fitting the model 
of levirate marriage followed by Macedonian successor states and already in operation as early as 478 in 
Sicily where Polyzalus married his brother’s wife Demarete in a bid to further his claims for the rule of 
Syracuse. For levirate marriage generally, see OGDEN 1999, xix-xxv. 
30 That Amyntas was not behind Philip’s murder has been argued convincingly by CARNEY 2015, 177 
who notes that Amyntas had little to gain and a lot to lose by committing such a crime. Nonetheless, a 
group must have supported him.  
31 Just. 9.4.3 informs us that Antipater had accompanied Alexander to Athens after Chaeronea. 
Additionally, Isocrates (Ep. 4) and Plutarch (Alex 9.1) both inform us that Antipater had been regent in 
Macedonia during Philip’s absences. That Antipater and Alexander had a form of philia is thus highly 
likely. 
32 CARNEY 2015, 128-131 cf. BOSWORTH 1971. 







fresh assessment through the model of philia-networks. Lyncestian Alexander had 
married the daughter of Antipater which, if pre-dating the events of 366, demonstrates 
that both men already had a strong political relationship. The horizontal exchange here 
is also clear to see, with Alexander, son of Aëropus, married into a distinguished family 
with influence at the centre of Philip’s court. In return Antipater widened his philia-
network to encompass a man with influence in the less-securely controlled regions to 
the north34. Such a marriage was all the more pertinent if it is also accepted that 
Parmenio had friends in the regions of Upper Macedonia and, therefore, Antipater was 
seeking to redress the political imbalance in that region. In any case, what had begun 
as a relatively typical political marriage in Philip’s lifetime became a vital relationship 
after his death. Antipater needed to ensure his own position was stable and supporting 
Alexander appears to have been his preferred choice35. Lyncestian Alexander, whose 
brothers had chosen to back another, was forced to break one of the two competing 
bonds of philia. That he chose to side with Antipater can be explained, once again, in 
terms of a horizontal exchange of services: Alexander, son of Aëropus, declares for 
Alexander, son of Philip and splits the Lyncestian support for Amyntas. In return 
Antipater ensures that Alexander III appropriately rewards his namesake, who was in a 
stroke uncontested as the leading Lyncestian at court36.  
Whatever support remained for Amyntas quickly crumbled and Justin (12.6.14; cf. 
Arr. An. 1.5.4) informs us that Alexander was able to dispose of his challenger 
permanently in 335. However, is turn of events was not as assured as it now appears. 
Even with support amongst Upper Macedonia split Amyntas remained a perfectly 
viable candidate for the throne and his claim should have been strengthened further 
when Cleopatra, daughter of Attalus, was murdered by Alexander’s philoi, severing 
Attalus’ connection with the royal household and effectively ending his philia with 
Parmenio37. Parmenio now had to choose a new side. That he entertained the notion of 
supporting Amyntas comes from a comment put into the mouth of Alexander by Curtius 
(6.9.16) where it is stated that Philotas had supported Amyntas against Alexander. The 
only way to reconcile this comment with the philia-networks that had developed at this 
time is to assume that after Cleopatra was killed, Philotas had been in discussion with 
Amyntas about supporting his claim. The reason why the support for Amyntas 
crumbled quickly after this point can be placed at a decision by Parmenio to instead 
lend his support to Alexander, concluding, for various reasons but likely due to a lack 
of military support for Amyntas, that Alexander was the better option for his own 
future. Parmenio’s later assassination of Attalus was surely a bid to provide a service 
to Alexander in exchange for his own exoneration in Attalus’ plotting and a 
continuation of his status as the leading commander in Macedonia. To some extent this 
was also an inevitable outcome, Parmenio was at that time at the head of a large 
 
34 The marriage of Alexander and Antipater’s daughter is attested in Curt 7.1.7; Justin 11.7.1; 12.14.1. 
35 This is easy to understand if it is accepted that Antipater served in the capacity of a mentor while 
Alexander was left as regent of Macedonia during Philip’s campaigns.  
36 CARNEY 2015, 130 is quite right to state that Alexander of Lyncestis was too important to be killed. 
His pardon was not a gift, but merely part of the exchange of services between the two Alexanders. The 
killing of the rest of Aëropus’ sons was adequate public action for the death of or the support of a rival 
claimant to the throne.  
37 Just. 9.7.8-9 claims that the murder was committed by Olympias. While she was surely capable of such 
action, Justin’s narrative of the episode is part of a wider attempt to portray Olympias as the murder of 
Philip and should not be taken at face value. It was politically expedient to murder Cleopatra and any 
among Alexander’s adherents could have done so; Alexander certainly did not intervene. 






advanced force with very little to tie it to the new king, it was mutually beneficial for 
Parmenio to retain his prominence.   
The power of philia-networks was not broken, but rather strengthened in the events 
which followed Philip’s death and continued to retain its importance in the years 
leading up to the invasion of Asia Minor in 334. When Alexander marched against the 
Triballians he did so with Philotas in command of his cavalry (Arr. An. 1.2.5). Even 
with Alexander’s great displays of martial prowess both in the north and south in 
Greece, the makeup of Alexander’s forces travelling into Asia Minor in 334 were 
tribute to his continued embroilment in the philia-networks that had secured his 
succession. The philoi of Antipater had been greatly rewarded in the composition of the 
command structure (Appendix B): Lyncestian Alexander was a hipparch, and moreover 
in command of the formidable and important Thessalian cavalry; Antigonus 
commanded some 7,000 Greek mercenaries and Balagros remained a somatophylax, 
the most intimate of positions. Antipater himself was to stay behind, but in the 
unprecedented role of Strategos Autocrator which appears to have allowed great 
freedom of action38. Likewise, the high-status roles given to the philoi of Parmenio 
(Appendix A) also demonstrated the dominance of these political groupings at court: 
Amyntas, son of Andromenes was a taxiarch; Calas, son of Harpalus was a hipparch; 
Cleander clearly held a military posting, but its nature in 334 is unclear; Hegelochus 
commanded the hippeis prodromoi; Nicanor commanded in the hypaspists; Philotas 
was hipparch of the Companions; Polyperchon was a taxiarch and Parmenio himself 
was Alexander’s senior commander. The positions held by each of these men were 
more prominent than the roles assumed by men who could be called members of 
Alexander’s own philia-network with the exceptions of Cleitus, son of Dropides, and 
Craterus (see Appendix C). 
In addition to holding prestigious commands, the philoi of Antipater and Parmenio 
clearly had a great deal of access to the king which, as outlined previously, was itself a 
marker of distinction and the aim of court politics in the first place. Particularly well 
placed amongst Antipater’s philoi were Balagros and Lyncestian Alexander, whom 
Arrian (An. 1.25.1) makes it clear enjoyed personal access to the king. In the case of 
Parmenio’s grouping, personal access was the privilege of Parmenio himself, of 
Philotas whose physical closeness to the king is encapsulated by Curtius’ (6.9.26-7) 
statement at the moment of Philotas’ downfall that the troops were shocked to see a 
man usually by the kings side in a feast now on trial before them, and of Demetrius, a 
somatophylax about whom little is known39.    
 
 
PHILIA POLITICS IN THE PERSIAN CAMPAIGN 
 
Alexander’s attempts to break his political encirclement will form the basis of the rest 
of this paper. That Alexander was politically astute has not always been taken for 
granted and his attempts to play at politics in the court of Philip II, most notably through 
his attempts to sabotage the marriage of his half-brother to the daughter of Pixodarus 
 
38 Antipater’s dealing with the Spartan revolt of 331 displayed the widespread nature of his authority and 
is attested by Arr. An. 1.11.3 and D.S. 17.62-3. 
39 HECKEL 2006, 108 correctly resists conflating this Demetrius the brother of Antigonus 
Monophthalmus. If the two men were indeed kin it is odd that Antigonus’ career suffers no detriment 
post-Philotas’ murder. The only references to this Demetrius come when he is removed from office and 








of Caria, have often been held as evidence that Alexander was naive in the political 
arena40. Nonetheless, Alexander had grown up at the court of the most powerful man 
of his generation and had personally experienced the benefits of being in the king’s 
presence and the detriments of exile. It is foolish to assume that Alexander did not gain 
some nous from his experiences, even if he had made mistakes in earlier life. 
Furthermore, the exile of Erygius, Harpalus, Nearchus and Ptolemy for their parts in 
the Pixadarus affair demonstrates that Alexander had his own philoi and was himself 
playing at philia politics. As could be expected when your philos is the king, each of 
these men was hastily recalled when Philip died and would go on to prominence (see 
Appendix C and discussion below). 
Alexander had also shown that he was far from naïve in what it meant to be a king. 
Although he certainly remained constricted in his scope for political action by the 
philia-networks that surrounded him, Alexander had already begun to show his 
awareness of self-representation as a crucial facet of his rule. The one moment of 
Alexander’s accession which was conclusively of his own making had been his speech 
to the assembled troops pledging his loyalty to them, to his father’s mode of rule and 
abolishing taxes for them41. Furthermore, after his crushing of the Theban-led rebellion 
to his rule in Greece, Alexander had utilised the festival at Dium to put on a 
demonstration of his power. Diodorus (17.17.3-4) gives an account of the events which 
make the festival sound distinctly similar to that of a Hellenistic king, nonetheless there 
is no reason suggest that Diodorus is incorrect about the events, especially given 
Philip’s increasingly lavish self-representation prior to his death42. Additionally, as 
Spawforth has noted, Alexander made use of similar displays at Ephesus, Soli and 
Memphis later in his rule to display his power43. Alexander understood kingship well, 
he merely had to reshape the politics of his court in order to pursue it as he wished.  
This process of reclaiming the power at court began immediately for Alexander, 
although almost certainly unintentionally, with the removal of Antipater from 
Alexander’s presence through Antipater’s own advancement to Strategos Autocrator44. 
Nonetheless, what had happened to Antipater was to happen to, although with far less 
prestige, his philoi serving Alexander in 334. It was not a coincidence that many of the 
earliest Achaemenid satrapies captured by Alexander were given to philoi of 
Antipater45. Arrian (An. 1.29.3) informs us that Phrygia was given to Antigonus, Lydia 
to Asander (An. 1.17.7) and Cilicia to Balagros in 333/2 (An. 2.12). Playing upon the 
vertical axis of exchange and the desire amongst the elite to gain prestige, Alexander 
systematically promoted Antipater’s philoi to the command of satrapies. The exchange 
was prestige in return for loyalty, with the bonus of separation from court of those 
Alexander did not want in his inner circle and men desperate to prove their worth placed 
into strategic positions. Ultimately, the reward of a satrapy placed the office-holder into 
a debt they were unlikely to repay without exceptional conduct and the efficacy of this 
 
40 Eg. RUZICKA 2010, 9-10.  
41 D.S. 17.2.2-3. Only Alexander could have made the speech, therefore, his agency is clear at this time.  
42 P. Oxy 15. 1798 cf. SPAWFORTH 2007, 90; contra FREDRICKSMEYER 2000, 191. Other instances include 
Philip’s statue: D.S. 15.92.5, and more generally his hospitality at Aeschin. 2.41-2; 47; 51-2. 
43 SPAWFORTH 2007, 92-3. 
44 The unprecedented power of the position suggests Antipater was not being removed from influence, 
rather this was a genuine reward for services rendered and, even if Alexander felt constrained by 
Antipater’s presence and that of his philoi, Alexander must have trusted Antipater’s ability to carry out 
the role.  
45 HECKEL 2003, 210 has made passing reference to the use of promotion for political reasons with 
regards to Antipater’s philoi.  






arrangement was shown by the success of Antigonus’ wars in the Taurus Mountains46. 
Alexander’s later willingness to punish ineffective or openly abusive satraps, if already 
the case, certainly would have encouraged such behaviour47.  
Alexander’s desire to remove those he did not fully trust from positions of privilege 
is also evidenced in the changing composition of the somatophylakes. To be a 
somatophylax was to have access and, better still, public acknowledgement of your 
elevated status. It is then less a surprise than an inevitability that almost all of 
Alexander’s closest philoi, his hetairoi, were appointed (see also Appendix C). By 329, 
the somatophylakes were: Aristonus, Hephaestion, Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Peithon, 
Perdiccas and Ptolemy. Alexander’s bodyguard had become a reflection of who he 
trusted and had given official status to go with the informal influence that many of these 
men must already have held; membership of the somatophylakes served as a mark of 
the king favour and trust. The changes to the somatophylakes provide a stark contrast 
to the movements of Antipater’s philoi.  
Of course, there are always exceptions and the exception amongst the philoi of 
Antipater was Alexander, son of Aëropus. Nonetheless, when viewed through the prism 
of philia-networks Alexander’s grizzly demise must be understood as a product of the 
rivalries between the philia-networks of Alexander’s court. Alexander owed, at least in 
part, his position as king to the acceptance of his Lyncestian namesake and Alexander 
had rewarded him with command of the Thessalian Cavalry and a prominent position 
at court. Nonetheless, there remains two important features regarding Alexander, son 
of Aëropus, and his relationship with Alexander, the king. The first, is that Lyncestian 
Alexander cannot have been above suspicion for his role in the bid of Amyntas for the 
throne in 336/5. He may have been able to rehabilitate his standing with the king, but 
he the actions of his brothers and his potential to have been involved was a mark he 
would have to carry forward. Secondly, Lyncestian Alexander’s most prominent 
political ally was Antipater, who was not only increasingly at odds with Alexander, but 
was also geographically distant48. In the game of court politics, Lyncestian Alexander 
was an easy target.  
The declining position of Lyncestian Alexander was exacerbated and made 
considerably worse by the choices Alexander (the king) had made to fill the void left 
by the removal of Antipater’s other philoi. Alexander’s own close adherents, men such 
as Hephaestion, were attaining prominence at this time and beginning to receive official 
positions. The decision to allow Hephaestion to choose the king of the Sidonians in the 
winter of 333/2 and his appointment as a somatophylax are both evidence of his 
increasingly public political role at the time49. In tandem with the rise of Alexander’s 
own philoi was the continuing power of Parmenio. Alexander had split his forces in the 
early stages of the campaign, with himself leading half and Parmenio trusted to lead the 
other half. Such responsibility was not awarded lightly and, whilst the two were to grow 
estranged later, what the two men had to offer each at this stage far outweighed any 
 
46 Curt. 3.1.22, cf. Curt. 4.5.13 for Balagros’ role.  
47 Alexander was not beyond punishing his satraps for misconduct eg. Arr. An. 6.27.4. 
48 The importance of geographical distance in this affair has been noted by CARNEY 2015, 131f. Carney 
also makes note of the potential involvement of Olympias and Parmenio, both of whom had motives to 
see Lyncestian Alexander removed. BADIAN 2000 [2012], 434 blames Alexander himself and calls it a 
false conspiracy.    
49 Hephaestion’s role in the appointment of the king is recorded in Curt. 4.1.15-26; Plu. Mor. 340c-d and 








enmity. In this case the horizontal axis of exchange can be witnessed in operation, with 
a service bound relationship flourishing.  
This leads to the supposed plot itself. Arrian states (An. 1.25.3; cf. Curt. 3.7.12, who 
names Nabazanes in place of Darius) Lyncestian Alexander had been in negotiation 
with Darius III about assassinating King Alexander. The messenger who was bringing 
the terms of the agreement to Lyncestian Alexander, Sisines, was caught and 
interrogated by Parmenio, who established Lyncestian Alexander’s guilt. Next, 
Alexander, having arrested his namesake, called a council (An. 1.25.5) at which it was 
decided that Lyncestian Alexander was not only untrustworthy, but that he was too 
popular with the Thessalians whom he commanded to be left in control.  
Ernst Badian has claimed that this entire plot was invented by Alexander to remove 
his namesake for political reasons; he was not trusted, and he was in Alexander’s way50. 
In contrast, Waldemar Heckel has argued that the plot must in fact have been real51. 
Heckel makes the case that the year in which the plot occurred, 333 (following the 
dating from Arr. An 1.25.1-10), was the year in which Alexander appears to have been 
at his most dependent on the philoi of Antipater; this was the year of Antigonus’ and 
Balagros’ campaigns in the Taurus Mountains and the year in which Agis III of Sparta 
began his open revolt against Macedonian hegemony in Greece52. However, this 
explanation is incomplete and does not give credence enough to the role of gift-
exchange in reshaping philia-networks continually. That Alexander had a dependence 
on men such as Antigonus at that moment is indisputable, however, to call these men 
philoi of Antipater at that same moment is to miss the subtleties of philia-networking. 
The bond between Antipater and his philoi had not been broken, however, these same 
men now had a debt to repay for Alexander, who had given them their newly acquired 
status. Furthermore, men such as Antigonus may have been philoi of Antipater, but that 
did not require them to have the same relationship with each other. Philia politics was 
not so neat: what did Antigonus care of the fate of Alexander, son of Aëropus? Those 
among Antipater’s philoi who had been rewarded with satrapies were expected to carry 
out their roles as functionaries of the king and it was in their interests to do so. The next 
key moment is recorded by Arrian (1.25.5), who states that Alexander consulted a 
council before coming to his decision. Arrian gives us no hint of who was included in 
this meeting; however, Hephaestion was almost certainly present in his new capacity 
as a somatophylax and it seems likely that Craterus, another ambitious philos of the 
king was present, as it was his brother who took the verbal message to arrest Lyncestian 
Alexander to the guard (An. 1.25.9-10). In addition, Parmenio had sent Sisines to 
Alexander for questioning (1.25.4) and, it seems likely, that Philotas would have played 
some role if he were not with his father at this time, although this cannot be proven.  
Charting the philiai of those involved suggests that Lyncestian Alexander was 
probably the victim of the dynamics of a violent court in which he had few philoi. The 
entire affair appears to have occurred very swiftly, Arrian makes no comment of 
Lyncestian Alexander being given the opportunity to defend himself, and Curtius’ 
account (7.1.6-10) suggests that he was only given the opportunity some three years 
 
50 BADIAN 2000 [2012], 56-60. 
51 HECKEL 2003 [2012], 213 n.68. However, the individual Alexander most relied upon, Antigonus, had 
no reason not to serve Alexander well in this year regardless of any personal convictions. Alexander had 
given him his position and if Alexander’s campaign was to prove unsuccessful, Antigonus would 
certainly have lost his satrapy, and the wealth and status it came with, to the advancing army of Darius. 
Additionally, Alexander remained sufficiently close and sufficiently powerful to extract revenge.  
52 HECKEL 2003, 213 n. 68. For Antigonus’ war in Cilicia see: Curt. 4.1.35. For Balagros: Curt. 4.5.13-
4. For Agis III: D.S. 17.48.1; 62.8-63.4; Arr. An. 1.11.3. 






later, prior to his long-delayed execution. Ultimately, the truth of the tale, as with the 
death of Philip, is less important than the role it played in the power dynamics between 
the competing philia-networks of Alexander’s court. Antipater’s philoi suffered from 
their patron’s absence and their lack of connections with other networks. The pattern of 
Alexander’s reign had been set firmly, the king would do what was necessary to break 
his political fetters.  
Of course, Alexander’s engagement with philia-networks was not restricted to a 
systematic removal of Antipater’s philoi, but extended to philoi of Parmenio also. 
Understandably, much of the focus regarding the downfall of Parmenio has related to 
the “Philotas Affair” of 330, however, Parmenio’s philia-network was vast and the 
“Philotas Affair” must be contextualised as the culmination of a process which, as noted 
by Badian, had begun much earlier53. The philia between Alexander and Parmenio had 
begun as one of utility. Parmenio had killed Attalus, both exonerating himself of 
conspiracy and removing Alexander’s remaining adversary in a demonstration of 
loyalty by Parmenio. Alexander, in turn, needed both Parmenio’s generalship and his 
political presence as a counter-weight to Antipater at a time when he simply could not 
promote his own philoi without overt nepotism and neglecting the man to whom he was 
indebted. Nonetheless, with each satrapy awarded to a philos of Antipater, Alexander’s 
political reliance on Parmenio was reduced and with each military victory, his own 
increasing status made Parmenio’s popularity amongst the men a hindrance rather than 
a help54.   
Several flashpoints between Alexander and Parmenio, as well as their respective 
philoi, demonstrated the growing tensions that would eventually break their philia. The 
earliest attested incident was at Granicus in 334, where Parmenio attempted to dissuade 
Alexander from launching his assault late in the day (Arr. An. 1.13.2-13; Plu. Alex. 
16.3) and, although this confrontation was hardly a major incident, it remains a useful 
marker from which to chart the growing disconnect between a youthful and impetuous 
king and his conservatively minded general. The next episode occurred in Egypt, where 
Arrian (An. 3.26.1) states that Philotas was saved by his father from charges of treason. 
This episode, far more serious than the first, showed how the tension between 
Alexander and Parmenio was paralleled in the tensions between Alexander’s and 
Parmenio’s philoi, who were undoubtedly competing factions by this time55. Philotas 
had probably always been unpopular. Certainly, the plot to oust him in Egypt appears 
to have been orchestrated by Craterus, who was in political ascendancy at that time56. 
Nonetheless, the basis of Craterus’ accusations –the notion that Philotas had spoken ill 
of Alexander and his divine pretensions post-Siwa– were certainly in keeping with the 
conservative Macedonian outlook espoused by Philotas’ father, Parmenio, and thus the 
root of the tale is believable. Additionally, if Curtius’ Hegelochus conspiracy (Curt. 
6.11.22-29) is indeed historical, Philotas’ views appear even more typical of the philoi 
 
53 BADIAN 1960 [2012], 327. However, Badian’s argument, based on Arr. An. 3.11.10 that Parmenio was 
disgraced through inglorious roles on the battlefield is an oversimplification. Parmenio’s role in the 
infantry can just as easily be placed as a tactical necessity on account of Parmenio’s brilliance as a general 
coupled with Alexander’s own preference for cavalry command.  
54 Popularity demonstrated when the troops revolted upon Parmenio’s death: D.S 17.80 cf. Curt. 7.2.35. 
Alexander’s desire to change the character of his rule was also important in the shaping his relationship 
with Parmenio. These matters have been discussed numerously: for the visit to the Zeus Ammon oracle 
at Siwa see BADIAN 1981 [2012], 27-71; FREDRICKSMEYER 2003, 270-78; LANE FOX 1973, 200-18. 
55 The notion of Alexander’s philoi seeing Parmenio’s faction, and Philotas in particular, as a block to 
their own advancement has already been well established: HECKEL 2003, 98-99,  







of Parmenio and thus Craterus’ accusations even more believable. It is not difficult to 
understand why the continued presence of Philotas at the highest level of Alexander’s 
court frustrated his own philoi.  
In addition to these two major incidents several other moments of tension are 
recorded in the sources: Parmenio’s desire to accept peace (Plu. Alex 29.7-9; Arr. An. 
2.25.1; D.S. 17.54; Curt. 4.11.1-14 and Justin 11.12.1-10); Parmenio’s attempts to 
persuade Alexander to fight by night at Gaugamela (Arr. An. 3.10.1-2 cf. Curt. 4.13.4) 
and most famously Parmanio’s recall of Alexander at Gaugamela (Arr. An. 3.15.1-2) 
Despite the fact that all these incidents, as Heckel has noted, appear to fit within a 
tradition set against Parmenio, it is clear that he and Alexander were at a crossroads in 
their relationship by 33057.  
The events of 330, in which Parmenio and Philotas both lost their lives, serve to 
demonstrate the lethal nature of philia politics and the depth of the rivalry between 
Alexander’s and Parmenio’s philoi. The first major moment was Alexander’s decision 
to leave Parmenio in Ecbatana before advancing east. Viewed as a gift-exchange, the 
position in Ecbatana served as a suitable reward for the services that Parmenio had 
rendered for Alexander in the campaign to that point58. Indeed, if the station were to be 
permanent, such a vital position could be represented as an adequate match for the role 
Antipater was performing in Europe, with Alexander due to continue east. Nonetheless, 
it cannot escape notice that the decision to leave Parmenio in Ecbatana at the point 
where the philia between himself and Alexander was at its most stretched appears very 
similar to Alexander’s use to satrapal appointments to separate himself from the philoi 
of Antipater in Asia Minor.  
The removal of Parmenio from court was to be followed by the execution of Philotas 
on charges of treason, and by Parmenio’s own demise later that year. Both deaths were 
the result of changing balances of power among philia-networks in a highly charged 
and militarised environment, and both occurred with Alexander’s blessing. The philoi 
of Parmenio lost a great deal of security with the removal of their chief benefactor from 
court. Men such as Coenus, the sons of Andromenes and most importantly Philotas 
were outside of the direct favour of Alexander and clearly set against the rising political 
power of men such as Hephaestion, Leonnatus, Craterus and Ptolemy. The increasing 
status of Alexander’s own philoi had been never more apparent, with the appointment 
of Hephaestion (Arr. An. 1.22.4) and Leonnatus (3.5.5) as somatophylakes and 
Craterus’ command of a substantial body of infantry at Issus (2.8.4). Importantly, the 
appointment of Hephaestion and Leonnatus as somatophylakes must have had the 
important effect of controlling access to the king, at the very least ensuring their own 
access to the king, to the detriment of Parmenio’s philoi. Such a situation emboldened 
Alexander’s philoi and could only lead to infighting. 
These were the politics that led to Philotas’ downfall. The “Philotas Affair”, as the 
incident is commonly known, must have been the result of a real conspiracy59. 
Nonetheless, the downfall of Philotas as a collaborator in the conspiracy was certainly 
the work of Alexander’s philoi. It is impossible, as with the murder of Philip, to come 
 
57 HECKEL 2006, 191 and n. 516 where it is noted that the tradition likely originates in the immediate 
aftermath of Alexander’s death with one of the first historians of events.  
58 That Parmenio was never supposed to join the expedition again cannot be known for certain, however, 
Alexander had proceeded as far as Phrada, which was a considerable distance from Ecbatana, and this 
does not suggest that Alexander had any intention to waiting for his general to catch up. Additionally, 
the fact that Alexander and Parmenio’s relationship had soured does not mean Parmenio could not be 
trusted to play his part at Ecbatana; any suggestion Parmenio would commit treason is surely overblown. 
59 The view of HECKEL 2003, 216-19; contra BADIAN 2000 [2012], 66-70.  






to a clear conclusion of the actual events that occurred due to the contrary nature of the 
source material. Nonetheless, the evidence from the aftermath of the conspiracy reveals 
a conspiracy of its own, hatched by philoi of the king to remove a rival for their own 
benefit. Curtius (6.2.8) places the decision to execute Philotas into the mouth of 
Craterus, and whilst the tale itself cannot be corroborated Curtius’ version of events sits 
neatly with the philia politics of the moment. As noted above, the enmity between 
Craterus and Philotas was evident as early as Egypt and can only have grown since. 
Alongside this, the chief beneficiaries of the execution of Philotas were Hephaestion 
and Cleitus, son of Dropides, who attain joint leadership of the Companion Cavalry 
(Arr. An. 3.27.4), two of Alexander’s closest philoi and certainly not men who appear 
to have openly rivalled Craterus at this time60. 
Alongside the trial of Philotas himself a number of other men were either prosecuted 
or put on trial by Alexander for their roles in the supposed conspiracy against him. Once 
again, the connections of the majority of those involved suggests that the prime 
motivator for these trials was court politics rather than the conspiracy of Dimnus. Arrian 
(An. 3.27.1-3) states that the sons of Andromenes –Amyntas, Attalus, Polemon and 
Simmias– were tried, but Amyntas, Attalus and Simmias were found to be innocent and 
Polemon, who had fled the scene, was acquitted upon his return. The decision to attempt 
prosecution of the sons of Andromenes was itself the result of philia-networking, with 
all those closely associated with Philotas, and by extension Parmenio, being bought to 
trial61. In particular, the trial of Amyntas –who appears closest to Philotas– discredited 
any potential defence of Philotas through besmirching Amyntas’ name. Nonetheless, 
that the sons of Andromenes were bound to escape prosecution has been alluded to by 
Waldemar Heckel, who notes the link between Andromenes and Polyperchon, son of 
Simias, meant that the sons of Andromenes could have had supporters from as many as 
one-third of the Macedonian infantry62. Once again the intertangled webs caused by 
philia-networking can be seen at play. The sons of Andromenes may have been 
connected with Philotas on one side, but they also had support and loyalty amongst 
entirely different networks who were sufficiently important to ensure their survival. 
Alexander may have been content to sanction murder of Philotas as it gave him an 
excuse to be rid of Parmenio, but this would have been a dangerous moment to test 
further the loyalty of the army. Whilst the politics of philia had resulted in the death of 
Philotas and Parmenio, it had also saved the sons of Andromenes.  
The political ramifications of the Dimnus Plot did not end here. Parmenio and 
Philotas both counted amongst their philoi the brothers Coenus and Cleander, with the 
former married to Parmenio’s daughter63. It is telling that neither brother spoke in 
defence of their philos and both appear to have benefited from his downfall. In Arrian’s 
(An. 4.17.3) narrative Coenus emerges next in the historical record as the commander 
of a detachment subjugating Sogdiana and continues to hold prominent positions within 
 
60 Although later Hephaestion and Craterus were to come to blows, most famously being separated by 
Alexander himself.  
61 Arrian’s statement (An. 3.27.2) that the flight of Polemon added credence to the theory that a plot had 
taken place and, presumably also adding weight to the charges that the sons of Andromenes were 
involved is intriguing and probably reflects how the incident of Polemon’s flight must have appeared. 
However, it is just as likely that Polemon, much like Coenus (see below), could sense the way that the 
wind was blowing and took the opportunity to flee. If Polemon were guilty of the plot itself it seems 
unlikely he would have been acquitted, Alexander had been content to remove the brothers of Alexander, 
son of Aëropus, whilst leaving Alexander himself untouched to maintain the balance of power required 
at court in 336.  
62 See HECKEL 2006, 25. 







the army throughout the rest of his life, eventually dying on the return of India (Arr. 
An. 6.1.1, 2.1; cf. 5.29.5; Curt 9.3.20).64 Meanwhile, Arrian (An. 3.26.3) directly 
implicates Cleander in the murder of Parmenio, stating that he orchestrated events in 
Ecbatana. When Cleander next surfaces, it is to face crimes of maladministration for 
which he faced execution (Arr. An. 6.27.4; Curt 10.1.1-7), having remained in Media 
when Alexander continued to India. The success of the sons of Polemocrates after a 
plot in which they were likely to have been implicated must be the result of an exchange 
of services between the brothers and Alexander, or the brothers and Alexander’s philoi; 
likely both. Cleander was, ironically, in a similar position to Parmenio in 336, turning 
his back on his philos in order to save his own life and position. In return for his part in 
the murder, he was exonerated for his previous association. Coenus’ position was even 
more tenuous in 330. He was physically at court and implicating him in the murder 
would have been the simple solution to be rid of him. Additionally, due to his kinship 
with Philotas his involvement would have been believable. In return for his life, he 
could be expected to remain loyal to the king and in return for that loyalty status would 
steadily follow. Alexander had repositioned the loyalty of the sons of Polemocrates, 
placing them into his ever increasing philia-network.  
The extent to which the conviction of Philotas was also a turning point in the philia 
politics of Alexander’s court cannot be overstated. It comes as no surprise that the 
members of Alexander’s council –Coenus, Craterus, Erigyius, Hephaestion and 
Leonnatus– almost all attained great success in the years that followed (See Appendix 
C). For example, Hephaestion was not only a somatophylax but had become a hipparch 
of the Companion Cavalry after the execution of Philotas (Arr. An. 2.27.4). Prior to this, 
Hephaestion’s only military role is given to us by Curtius (4.5.10) who states that 
Hephaestion had been given command of the supply fleet sending siege equipment from 
Tyre to Gaza. Nonetheless, even this early command demonstrates philia politics in 
action. At the time, Alexander’s chief naval officer appears to have been Hegelochus, 
a philos of Parmenio. Nonetheless, the substantial gap between Hephaestion’s 
command in the Mediterranean and his command of the Companions is testament to 
the hold on offices Parmenio’s philoi held. Later, Hephaestion would become chiliarch 
(Arr. An. 7.14.10) and the most powerful of Alexander’s philoi completing the process 
of surrounding himself with men he trusted.  
Much like Hephaestion, Craterus owed his great position in Macedonian society to 
Alexander. A commander of the pezhetairoi at Granicus in 334, by 332 Craterus had 
an independent command –overseeing the siege of Tyre in the absence of Alexander65. 
Additionally, both Arrian (An. 3.18.4-8) and Curtius (5.4.14-34) place Craterus as the 
commander who led an entire portion (the greater portion) of the army whilst Alexander 
outflanked Ariobarzanes at the Persian Gates. This was a command which could quite 
conceivably have been given to Parmenio and as such the decision to give it to Craterus 
was political as much as it was military; the decision to promote Craterus to the role 
and leave Parmenio in Ecbatana was not the same as leaving Craterus in command of 
the siege of Tyre. Alexander had not begun the project and left to settle other affairs, 
taking Parmenio with him in the process and thus denying him command through 
having need of him elsewhere. In this instance, Alexander was sending a clear statement 
about the future roles of the two men in his forces: Parmenio’s time on the battlefield 
 
64 Of course, the death of Coenus has been viewed with suspicion on account of its convenient timing, 
once again demonstrating that the political networks in Alexander’s court were extremely fluid. See 
BADIAN 1961 [2012], 22-3 who casts doubts on the death not only of Coenus, but also of Cleander.  
65 Curt. 4.3.1. 






was over and Craterus’ time to lead had arrived. It was time for one of Alexander’s own 
philoi to occupy the role. The reciprocal exchange between Alexander and Craterus is 
also clear: Alexander had given Craterus everything, loyalty was what he expected in 
return. Craterus’ desire to demonstrate this loyalty may also have played a part in his 
longing to see Philotas, whom he had suspected since Egypt, to be removed from the 
king’s presence. There is nothing to suggest that his own hatred of Philotas and his 
sense of duty to Alexander were mutually exclusive, both could have been motivators.  
Alexander may have promoted the interests of his philoi more vigorously than was 
necessary of a king, perhaps due to the insecurity that the early parts of his life and 
reign had imbedded in him, but Alexander always acted with a high degree of political 
acumen in the period until 32866. For example, Hephaestion was promoted to command 
the Companions, but Cleitus was promoted alongside him and presumably carried out 
the role in practice67. In the shadow of Alexander’s calculated treatment of others, the 
peculiar career of Harpalus, son of Machatas, becomes even more curious. Harpalus 
had been a philos of Alexander since youth and had evidently supported his philos in 
his bid to claim the daughter of Pixodarus in marriage in 336 (Arr. An. 3.6.5; Plu. Alex. 
10.4). Harpalus’ support for Alexander at this early stage in his life was not forgotten, 
with Harpalus returning to accompany Alexander into Asia before fleeing prior to the 
Battle of Issus with a large bulk of money68. Harpalus then returned to Alexander, 
apparently forgiven, and was instated as treasurer to the king at Ecbatana. Harpalus 
must also have played a role in carrying out the murder of Parmenio, once again lending 
his support to Alexander in a difficult moment69. Events after this are not of concern 
here, but the fact that Harpalus’ behaviour in his second stint as treasurer was even 
worse can surely not have surprised Alexander. Yet, Alexander was willing to continue 
to promote Harpalus’ interests even when it was clearly to the detriment of his own 
rule. 
Harpalus, and his deviant behaviour, is testament to the weakness of philia-networks 
as a method of conducting court politics. As Aristotle (eg. 1161a33-34) makes clear, 
bonds of philia were nearly always fluid, especially if they were philiai of utility. It 
appears that the bond between Alexander and Harpalus ran much deeper, although the 
sources do not reveal any details to substantiate the claim beyond the fact that Harpalus 
was involved in the ‘Pixodarus affair’ and Alexander forgave him for fleeing prior to 
Issus. Nonetheless, this is the only explanation that accounts for Alexander’s actions. 
Harpalus was the exception that proved the rule when it came to Alexander’s careful 
utilisation of philia-networks, and simultaneously a portent of what was to come later 
in Alexander’s reign as the king’s struggles with his own ambitious philoi grew70. 
By the time Alexander defeated Satibarzarnes in early 329 the makeup of his military 
command and court was radically different to the one which had set out in 334. In 334 
 
66 328 saw the murder of Cleitus, perhaps the first sign of Alexander losing firm control over his own 
philoi. The politics of the period from 328-323 were marked by power-struggles between Craterus and 
Hephaestion, attempts to reorganise the empire, revolts and attempts by Alexander to fuse the Argead 
and Achaemenid models of rule. On the murder of Cleitus see TRITLE 2000, 56-61; BADIAN 2000 [2012], 
69-71. 
67 See Arr. An. 3.27.4.  
68 Arr. An. 3.6.4-7. 
69 A detailed analysis of Harpalus’ role in Alexander’s court is given by BADIAN 1961 [2012], 23-4. 
70 Events later than the immediate fallout of the Dinmus plot are outside of the scope of this article. 
Alexander’s control of his philoi was to eventually disintegrate, perhaps due to his failure to balance 
them against each other and his desire to support those who supported his more Achaemenid presentation. 
This was to lead to a confrontation between Hephaestion and Craterus in India where the king himself 







Alexander was a king who had proven himself to be charismatic on the field of battle, 
but also a king who was indebted to key figures of his father’s reign who had chosen to 
support him. By the time the dust had settled on the plot of Dimnus Alexander’s court 
reflected the desires and prejudices of the king himself, who now firmly sat atop the 
political ladder. Philia-networks based upon reciprocal relationships were key to the 
political life of the Macedonian court in Alexander’s reign. The elite could only hope 
to exercise power through the king, which required proximity to his person. This could 
only be attained through advancement, especially in Alexander’s highly militarised 
court-on-the-move, and advancement only came from Alexander. Therefore, to 
advance was to have philoi in high places who could make a case for your own progress 
and in return a philos must do a favour. Alexander’s success at manipulating this social 
mechanism and placing his own philoi in power can be summarised through listing the 
names of the men still surviving when the king died who had also been present for 
either the ‘Pixodarus Affair’ or were on Alexander’s council in the trial of Philotas: 
Craterus, Leonnatus, Nearchus and Ptolemy; all four were to be major players in the 
aftermath of the king’s demise, a suitable exchange in return for their loyalty? 
 
  






APPENDIX A: PHILOI OF PARMENIO 
 
 




PRIOR TO GAUGAMELA 
POSITION(S) 329, END 
OF SUMMER 
PARMENIO Conducted operations in 
Asia Minor (e.g. Siege of 
Pitane: D.S. 17.17.9). 
 
Commander of the Infantry 
(Arr. An. 1.11.6;  
D.S. 17.17.3). 
Commanded the left 
wing at Granicus  
(Arr. An. 1.14.1).  
Again, at Issus  
(Arr. An. 2.8.9-10; Curt. 
3.9.8-10)  
and at Gaugamela  
(Arr. An. 3.11.10) 
Placed in charge of 





(Arr. An. 1.8.2.). 
Sent for reinforcements 
in Macedonia  
(D.S. 17.49.1; Curt. 
7.1.15; 37-8). 
 
Killed in action 




Killed.  — — 




Unknown. Unknown  
(would later serve  
as taxiarch). 
CALAS, SON OF 
HARPALUS 
Hipparch of the Thessalian 
Cavalry (D.S. 17.17.4). 
Satrap of Hellespontine 
Phygia 





Assumed to have a 
military role. 
Recruiting mission 





(Arr. An. 3.6.8; 3.12.2). 
Unknown  
(later executed). 
COENUS, SON OF 
POLEMOCRATES 
Commander as early as 
335 
(Arr. An. 1.6.9). 
Sent on a recruiting 
mission 
(Arr. An. 1.24.1-2). 
 
Commanded troops at 
Issus (Arr. An. 2.8.3; 
Curt. 3.9.7) and 
Gaugamela (Arr. An. 
3.11.9; Curt. 4.13.28; 
D.S. 17.57.2). 
One of the 
commanders at the 
Persian Gates 
(Arr. An. 3.18.6) 
HECTOR, SON OF 
PARMENIO 
No office. Drowned in the Nile 





Commanded in the hippeis 
prodromoi 
(Arr. An. 1.12.7). 
Joint commander of the 
fleet  
(Arr. An. 3.2.6). 
Died at Gaugamela 
(Arr. An. 3.11.8). 
— 
NICANOR, SON OF 
PARMENIO 
Commanded the 
hypaspists in the Getic war 
(Arr. An. 1.4.2). 
No change. 
(continued role attested 
in Arr. An. 1.14.2; 
2.8.3; 3.11.9;  
cf. Curt. 3.9.7; 4.13.27). 
Died of illness 










Cavalry Command in the 
Triballian campaign 
(Arr. An. 1.2.5). 
 
Commander of the 
Companion Cavalry  
(Curt. 6.9.21; D.S. 
17.17.4). 
No change, commanded 
the Companions at 
Gaugamela  
(Arr. An. 3.11.8;  









SON OF SIMMIAS 
Unknown. Taxiarch 
(D.S. 17.57.2). 
No change attested. 
SIMMIAS, SON OF 
ANDROMENES 
Unknown. Likely commanded 
Amyntas’ troops at 
Gaugamela 











APPENDIX B: PHILOI OF ANTIPATER 
 
 







POSITION(S) 329, END 
OF SUMMER 
ANTIPATER, SON OF 
IOLAS 
Strategos in Europe 
(Arr. An. 1.11.3; Curt 
4.1.39; Justin. 11.7.1; 
D.S. 18.12.1). 
No change. No change. 




(Arr. An. 1.25.2). 
Imprisoned 
(Arr. An. 1.25.3-10; 
Diod. 17.32). 
Executed. 
(Curt. 7.1.5-9; D.S. 
17.80.2; Just. 12.14.1) 
AMYNTAS, SON OF 
ARRHEBAEUS 
Commanded a scouting 
party of from the 
hippeis prodromoi 
(Arr. An. 1.12.7). 
Commands the left-
wing at Sagalassus  








Satrap of Phyrgia. 
(Arr. An. 1.29.3; Curt. 
4.1.35 states Lydia). 
No Change.  
BALAGROS 
(BALACRUS) SON OF 
NICANOR 
somatophylax Satrap of Cilicia 
(Arr. An. 2.12.2; D.S. 
18.22.1). 
Either no change or 
perished in Lycaonia  
(Curt. 4.5.13). 
CASSSANDER, SON OF 
ANTIPATER 
— — — 
IOLUS, SON OF 
ANTIPATER 
— — Paides Basilikoi 
(Justin. 12.14.6-9). 
PHILIP, SON OF 
ANTIPATER 










APPENDIX C: PHILOI OF ALEXANDER 
 
 






POSITION(S) 329, END OF 
SUMMER 
CLEITUS, SON OF 
DROPIDAS 
Ilarch of the Ile Basilike 
(Arr. An. 1.15). 
No Change.  Hipparch of the 
Companion Cavalry 
(Arr. An. 2.27.4). 
CRATERUS, SON 
OF ALEXANDER  
Commander of the 
pezhetairoi 
(Arr. An. 1.14). 
Commander of 
infantry at Issus  
(Arr. An. 2.8.4). 
Held a string of 
independent commands 
(e.g. Oversaw a siege:  






(Arr. An. 3.11.8). 
Unknown, next seen as a 
hipparch in 327 
(Arr. An. 4.27.5). 
ERIGYIUS, SON 
OF LARICHUS 
Possibly commanded a 
cavalry force 
(D.S. 17.17.4). 




(Arr. An. 3.11.10; 









(Arr. An. 3.6.4-7). 
Absconded and 
returned 
(Arr. An. 3.6.4). 
Left in Ecbatana with 
Parmenio, exact role 
undefined 
(Arr. An. 3.19.7;  




No formal role attested. Asked to choose a 
king for the Sidonians 
(Curt. 4.1.15-26;  
Plu. Mor. 340c-d; 
D.S. 17.46.6). 
 
Oversaw logistics of 




(Arr. An. 1.22.4,7 
informs us of the 
death of Ptolemy, a 
somatophylax, and 
provides a likely 
date.) 
Commander of the 
Companion Cavalry 
(Arr. An. 3.27.4). 
LEONNATUS, SON 
OF ANTEAS 





(Arr. An. 3.5.5). 





Unknown.  Likely period of appointment as somatophylax 
(explicitly so: Arr. An. 5.24.5, 6.28.4, certainly by 
328: Curt. 8.1.13-17). 
NEARCHUS, SON 
OF ANDROTIMUS 
No Role.  Satrap of Lycia and 
Pamphylia 
(Arr. An. 3.6.6;  
Just. 13.4.15). 
No change, prominent 
later. 








Commanded a taxis in the 
European conflicts 
(Arr. 1.6.9, 1.8.1-3; 
D.S. 17.12.3). 
Commanded a taxis at 
both Issus and 
Gaugamela 
(Arr. An. 2.8.3; 




(Arr. An. 3.16.9;  
cf. Curt. 6.8.16). 




Prominence out of period. 
PTOLEMY, SON 
OF LAGUS 
Unknown. Unknown. First command 
(Arr. An. .3.18.9). 
 
Appointed somatophylax 
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